Using tax abatements, financial incentives, and public investments to attract (or retain) firms is the primary economic development tool for many local governments. Often local job creation policies focus on increasing capital through grants, low-interest financing, and other economic development incentives. Theory predicts that capital subsidies induce firm behaviors that limit their job creation effects. This paper employs the Incentives Environment Index, constructed from state constitutional provisions that limit and structure the ability of state and local governmental entities to aid private enterprises, and five-year county panels to test theoretical predictions on county capital expenditure and input mixes as well as industry establishment shares. The results indicate the act of increasing capital subsidy tools is associated with capital-labor substitution, decreased employment density, and changes in local industry mix. Results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and measures of capital subsidy availability.
INTRODUCTION
Responsibility for policies supporting local economic growth and jobs increasingly lies with state and local policymakers. As political polarization and limited federal resources hamper federal responses to the sluggish labor market, demands for state and local officials "to do something about jobs" will likely increase (Bartik 2012) . Often local job creation policies focus on increasing business retention and recruitment through grants, low-interest financing, and other nontax economic development incentives. These nontax incentives effectively subsidize capital rather than labor; yet they are touted as job creation policies.
Despite being featured prominently in public debate on economic development incentives, there are few studies of nontax incentives (cash and near-cash grants, low-interest financing, free land and buildings, and so on). In part, this is due to lack of data on state and local nontax capital subsidies. The few existing studies rely on spending measures, which lump capital subsidies with other types of economic development programming and miss a portion of nontax incentives, or program measures. Studies employing economic development spending tend to find positive effects, while studies using program measures generally find negative or insignificant effects. Both spending and program measures present challenges to identifying the causal effect of capital subsidy incentives. In a "stellar illustration of pertinent, path-breaking research on state incentives" (Woodward 2012, p. 11) , Patrick (2014a) develops the Incentive Environment Index (IEI) to investigate the effects of nontax capital subsidies on jobs. Patrick finds that increasing the ability of governments to aid private enterprise has a negative mediumterm effect on rural county employment levels and no significant effect otherwise. Her results are consistent with program measure-based findings that incentives don't support local job creation.
The research herein investigates the potential mechanisms underlying these findings for incentives aimed at subsidizing capital. Theory outlined in this paper predicts that capital subsidies will have two effects. The first effect is capital-labor substitution, whereby firms that can substitute capital for labor adjust their input mix in favor of capital. The theory also predicts that subsidy-induced changes in total costs allow relatively capital-intensive firms to outbid relatively labor-intensive firms for land, causing changes in locations' industry mix. Taken together, these two effects lead to no change or decreases in local employment levels-even if subsidies induce firm location on the margin.
The present paper employs the IEI and five year county panels to test theoretical predictions on county manufacturing capital expenditure and input mixes as well as industry establishment shares. A rich set of control variables and first-differencing helps to isolate the effect of capital subsidy availability. Previous research also suggests rural and urban areas respond differently to job creation stimuli. The paper therefore analyzes rural and urban counties separately. A subset of urban counties located in multi-state MSAs is also examined. The results indicate increasing capital subsidy availability is associated with both capital-labor substitution and changes in local industry mix, limiting the job creation effects of these policies. Consistent with previous findings, urban and rural counties respond differently to an increase in the IEI, and pooling counties masks heterogeneity in the effects for rural and urban counties. This suggests that incentive effects may vary with the level of agglomeration. Capital subsidies appear most effective at inducing capital expenditure in urban areas. Capital expenditure per employee increases with capital subsidies, and employment density declines. As predicted by theory, relatively capital-intensive industries increase their establishment shares at the expense of relatively labor-intensive industries, with which they compete for land.
The results are robust to an alternative border fixed-effects random trend specification.
The sample is limited to counties that share a state border, and the first-differenced equation is estimated with a border-specific fixed effect. This method has the advantage of focusing on within-border-area variation induced by differences in capital subsidy availability. The results are also robust to alternative measures constructed from state constitutional provisions governing public aid to private enterprises.
The paper proceeds in Section 2 by discussing key findings in the literature. Section 3 sketches a simple theoretical model of equilibrium changes under a capital subsidy regime. The data and empirical strategy are described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the estimation results, and Section 6 explores robustness. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
BACKGROUND ON NONTAX CAPITAL SUBSIDIES AND JOB CREATION
Despite decades of research on economic development incentives, there is relatively little research on the effects of nontax incentives. Yet these types of incentives (cash and near-cash grants, low-interest financing, free land and buildings, etc.) feature prominently in the public debate because this type of incentive most closely resembles the legalized bribery of companies and because it often makes up the bulk of incentives packages (Bartik 2012; Patrick 2014a ).
Consider, for example, the state and local incentives in Google's recent selection of North Carolina. Morgan (2009) estimates the tax incentive portions of the package (credits, exemptions, and refunds) totaled $91.6 million, compared to the $170 million grant portion of the package. Although comprehensive data on state and local economic development incentives are not available, some evidence suggests these incentives may account for as much as threequarters of state and local resources devoted to economic development (Bartik, Erickcek, and Eisinger 2003) . One survey of state economic development programs reports that "the percentage of businesses receiving more than $50,000 through nontax programs significantly exceeded that percentage for tax programs" (Council for Community and Economic Research 2013, p.19) . Patrick (2014a) analyzes the incentive packages contained in the Good Jobs First megadeals subsidy database from 1985-2000 and finds that the reported value of the nontax portion was 1.7 times greater than the value of the tax incentives. 1 The few studies of nontax incentives yield mixed results, in part because of differences in measures of incentives and methodologies. This line of research generally relies upon state measures of economic development expenditures or programs. These measures pose challenges for identifying the causal effect of nontax incentives (that effectively subsidize capital) on jobs.
For example, de Bartoleme and Spiegel (1997) and Goss and Phillips (1997) find a positive relationship between state economic development spending and job growth. However, it is difficult to interpret these results as the causal effect of nontax incentives on job creation, for a variety of reasons. Critically, state economic development spending does not capture local resources. These data are not generally available, but research suggests local spending is at least as much as state spending in some places, and much greater in others. 2 State economic development spending is likely endogenous to state economic conditions. Furthermore, economic development spending confounds the effects of different types of incentive programs 1 Details are available in the online appendix of Patrick (2014a) . The total value of nontax incentives was $2,925,800,000, compared to $1,750,120,000 for tax incentives, based upon the author's calculations. These values are exclusive of worker training incentives when possible. Another $95,000,000 was classified as "other." Incentives classified as "other" were unspecified in the source data. Analysis is available upon request from the author.
2 For example, Thomas (2011) reports the local/state subsidy ratio for Missouri-one of the few states for which he determined reliable data could be obtained-was 7:1. Thomas estimates total state and local spending by extrapolation and the assumption that most local subsidies equal state subsidies. and nonincentive activities. It is reasonable to expect that economic development activities such as marketing, technical assistance, and workforce training will have different effects from cash, grants, loans, site development, and low-interest financing. Economic development spending bundles all these activities together, and even detailed budget data doesn't readily allow for separation. 3 Rather than spending, other researchers employ program measures. Ó hUallacháin and Satterthwaite (1992) use tax rate measures, industrial revenue bond (IDB) financing, and program dummy variables. They find only the dummy variables for enterprise zones and university research parks have a positive statistical relationship with employment growth.
Recognizing the limitations of their empirical approach, Ó hUallacháin and Satterthwaite are careful not to claim causation. Goetz et al. (2011) create measures of the share of all possible programs available in states and characterize programs in terms of "race to the top" (RTT) and "race to the bottom" (RTB) policies. They find tax incentive and financial assistance programs may harm growth rather than help. However, even their classification does not distinguish between the effects of capital subsidization and other policies. For example, RTT policies include capital subsidy programs targeted at innovative firms. RTB policies include capital subsidy programs aimed at traditional industries.
Like spending, program variables may also be endogenous to economic conditions. In upon economic conditions (Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras 2010) . Empirical evidence is inconclusive with regard to the direction of bias, though. Both distressed and growing locations have been found to be more likely to use economic development incentives and create programs in response to local economic conditions. Incentive offers reflect local economic conditions, incentive packages offered by competing localities, and the "rules of the game" as dictated by federal and state constitutions. Patrick (2014a) overcomes some of the aforementioned challenges by creating the Incentives Environment Index (IEI) from state constitution provisions governing state and local government aid to private enterprise. These state constitution provisions originated in the mid-to-late nineteenth century in response to state and local government financial crises caused by participation in economic development projects (via railroads, canals, ferries, etc.). The types of programs available in locations across the United States are a direct reflection of the limits placed by these constitutional provisions. As detailed below, the IEI measures the ability of government to use public monies, credit, and property in the aid of private enterprise. It is not a measure of other types of economic development programming, such as human capital investments, amenities, tax breaks, or direct jobs programs. However, the availability of programs like industrial revenue bonds, venture capital funds, loan guarantee programs, etc., is directly governed by these constitutional provisions.
Similar to Ó hUallacháin and Satterthwaite (1992) and Goetz et al. (2011 ), Patrick (2014a finds little evidence that increasing the availability of these types of incentives supports local jobs. In particular, she finds that increasing the ability of governments to aid private enterprise has a significant negative medium-term effect on rural county employment levels, and no significant effect otherwise. Patrick (2014a) If capital subsidies induce additional capital without associated increases in jobs, then a number of underlying mechanisms may be at work. Induced capital could be redirecting capital from productive activities into overcapacity. As suggested by Gabe and Kraybill (2002) , managers may engage in additional rent-seeking as a result of increased incentive availability and make inefficient production decisions. Managers may also adjust to public aid by substituting capital or public inputs for labor. Hanson and Rohlin (2011) 
EQUILIBRIUM CHANGES WITH SUBSIDIES
Consider the effect of a capital subsidy on a firm's optimal choice of capital and labor.
Capital consists of equipment as well as the structure and land used in production. As discussed by McDonald and McMillen (2011) , one can think of firm output as a function of equipment, labor, and real estate, which includes both land and structure capital. It is also useful to impose Cobb-Douglas production technology, so that = 1− − , where is a given level of output, is equipment, is labor, and is real estate produced by structures and land , according to the Cobb-Douglas production function = 1− . The parameters and govern substitutability of real estate, equipment, and labor in the production of output; while the parameter governs the substitutability of land and structure in the production of real estate.
Assume the prevailing wage rate is , the price of equipment capital is , the price of structure construction is , and the price of land is . Now consider the optimal levels of labor and capital under a capital subsidy regime. Let be a capital subsidy that affects the price of equipment, structure, and land capital, such as low-interest financing, capital grants, loan guarantees, cash, etc. A profit-maximizing firm sets the ratio of the marginal products of inputs equal to their price ratio. Solving for optimal input levels given a target level of output, a profit-maximizing firm chooses inputs so that
and the price of output is normalized to one. Equations (1) -(4) indicate that optimal input choices depend upon capital intensity, the α and β parameters, as well as the amount of the subsidy . The amount of labor for a given output * is decreasing in capital subsidies and capital intensity; while equipment, structure, and land capital are increasing in the subsidy. The act of increasing capital subsidies therefore causes firms to substitute capital for labor; the degree of substitution depends upon the type-specific capital production parameters. This yields the first empirically testable prediction of the model:
all else being equal, capital expenditure should be higher in places with more capital subsidies.
It is also interesting to note that the ratio of labor to equipment, given by =
(1− − )(1− ) , depends upon the substitution parameters α and β and the amount of the subsidy . The optimal amount of labor per unit of equipment decreases as the subsidy increases, < 0, and decreases at a faster rate for those firms that can easily substitute real estate or equipment for labor (higher values of and , respectively). Similarly, < 0 and < 0, indicating that employment density declines as the subsidy increases and that it declines at a faster rate for relatively capital-intensive firms. As noted below, the capital expenditure data does not differentiate between equipment, structure, and land capital. Given these constraints, the model predicts capital expenditure per employee will increase with capital subsidies, and employment density will decrease.
It is easy to see that the optimal ratios of structure to land, equipment to structure, and equipment to land are unaffected by a subsidy of that applies equally to all types of capital.
Subsidies do not alter the capital input mix from the optimal without subsidies. However, capital subsidies that apply differentially to equipment, structures, and land will also induce changes in the optimal capital input ratios. Consider, for example, gifts of real estate and real estate leaseback agreements that subsidize land and building capital only (albeit at different rates).
According to this model, such incentives induce firms to decrease labor and equipment to real estate ratios while leaving the labor-equipment ratio unchanged. Real estate capital subsidies could therefore be associated with decreasing employment densities. On the other hand, a subsidy for only equipment capital induces equipment-labor substitution but leaves employment density unchanged.
The above discussion assumes that the price of land behaves like other capital prices.
Urban theory suggests that land markets differ substantially from equipment and construction markets. Within the context of a basic urban model, where land goes to the highest bidder and bids are determined by the amount left over after costs, those firms experiencing the largest cost reductions should win the bids for land. Setting the firm's willingness to pay for land (or the maximum amount the firm may pay for land and achieve zero economic profits) equal to
and substituting gives
. Equation (5) demonstrates how the effect of the subsidy regime varies by firms' ability to substitute capital for labor. Equation (5) increases in the value of the subsidy , and it increases faster for relatively capital-intensive firms (higher values of and ). Relatively capital intensive firms' WTP responds more because total costs decrease more for firms that have less ability to substitute away from capital or firms that are more capital-intensive. Capital subsidies are therefore most valuable to firms that have little ability to substitute away from capital, and those firms experiencing the largest cost reductions should win the bids for land. As increases, firms with higher values of ( + ) will outbid firms with lower values, with which they compete for land. Thus, as increases, the share of firms in relatively capital-intensive industries will increase. 4 Hanson and Rohlin (2011) approximate ( + ) = + , where and are capital costs and labor costs, respectively, from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) national income and product accounts (NIPA), and i denotes industry. Table 1 presents their approximations. Table 1 suggests that the share of establishments in FIRE, manufacturing, and transportation will increase at the expense of the relatively labor-intensive industries which compete for land with these sectors, such as wholesale trade, construction, and retail. The next section discusses the strategy and data employed to test these predictions.
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Empirical tests of the theory employ five-year county panels and the IEI to estimate the effect of increasing capital subsidy availability on manufacturing capital expenditure and input ratios as well as industry establishment shares. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and macroeconomic industry-time effects and first-differencing yields the following reduced-form fixed effect is included for each of these. The specification therefore compares counties on either side of the borders, and identification comes from differences in policy within the border areas.
Border fixed effects combined with first-differencing effectively make this specification a border fixed effects random trend specification, where time-invariant unobservables are removed and each border area is allowed to have its own growth rate.
Alternative measures constructed from state constitutional provisions are employed to check robustness of results to the implicit assumptions associated with using the IEI. The IEI sums individual clause scores to reflect substitution between covered incentives. Summing implicitly assumes incentive types have equal marginal effects, which may be a strong assumption. The sensitivity of results to this assumption is explored with estimates using a weighted IEI, where weights are determined using principal component factor analysis. Principal component factor analysis assumes that each of the clause scores reflects an underlying latent variable. In this case, the underlying latent variable could be broadly interpreted as the ability to aid private enterprises with public capital subsidies. Using the variation in the data, the exercise weights each clause score according to its contribution to the underlying latent variable. 5
The empirical strategy assumes that the effects of increasing capital subsidies are linear.
It is, however, possible that there are diminishing returns to the effects of capital subsidies. It is also possible that providing too many capital subsidies sends a negative business climate signal or raises concerns over state and local government subsidy-induced revenue shortfalls. If any of these are true, then the effects will be nonlinear. An alternative specification employing a set of indicator variables for relative position in the IEI distribution allows for this possibility.
Percentile indicators also alleviate concerns that firms might not be able to differentiate between small changes in capital subsidies by allowing behavior to vary according to relative position in the distribution of capital subsidy packages.
Data
The panel data for counties in the lower 48 states was obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau and the BEA. Data availability and consistency determined the periods of analysis. The
five-year panel includes data from 1972 to 1997. Table 2 can be readily gleaned from Table 3 . Georgia has the lowest IEI score in Table 2 . It also offers the fewest types of programs in Table 3 .
Consider, for example, cash and property inducements. The Table 2 current appropriations score reflects the fact that the Georgia state constitution prohibits gifts to private enterprises. Table 3 indicates that all three states operate direct The IEI provides both a measure of available programming and the limits of response. A measure of incentives created from constitutional provisions avoids the aforementioned endogeneity problems and exploits the dynamics of incentives competition. The constraints in state constitutional provisions are binding, prompting attempts to amend or revise them.
Constitutional amendment and revision generally requires several steps, often culminating in voter referendums. Results of recent votes on amendments reveal that voters are not always supportive of increasing available nontax incentives. For example, many state constitutions prohibit public issuance of general obligation bonds whose proceeds benefit private organizations. Three states amended their constitutions in 2010 to allow public entities to use general obligation bonds to finance economic development incentives; however, Texas voters rejected a proposed amendment to expand county government issuance of general obligation bonds for economic development in 2011 (Dinan 2011 (Dinan , 2012 Patrick 2014b ).
More than one-third of the states changed their constitutions at least once during the study period, with approximately 30 percent changing multiple times (Patrick 2014) .
Amendments tend to result from political movements focused on the role of government, political pressures associated with so-called corporate welfare, and competitive pressures to provide the new relevant baseline incentives (Patrick 2014a; Tarr 1998) . State constitutional amendments of this nature are not as obviously endogenous to local economic conditions as other potential measures, particularly considering that it is unlikely any single county's economic conditions will exert enough influence to induce state constitutional amendment. The empirical strategy employs county-level data and differences out state and local unobservables, which alleviate any remaining identification concerns. 
RESULTS

Manufacturing Capital and Input Ratios
County Two-Digit SIC Establishment Shares by Major Division
The results in Section 5.1 indicate significant differences in the effects for rural and urban counties. This section therefore presents results separately for rural and urban samples. Estimates for pooled samples are available in Appendix A.2. Table 6 , Panels A, B, and C, present the estimated change in industry shares of establishments by SIC major division for rural, urban, and multistate MSA counties, respectively. The unit of analysis is industry share, where industry is defined by two-digit SIC codes. Sample sizes vary by SIC major division because the number of two-digit SIC codes varies between divisions. The increase in service establishment shares is not entirely consistent with theoretical predictions. The service SIC major division contains a wide variety of two-digit industries. It is therefore plausible that relatively capital-intensive two-digit industries drive the increase in service establishment shares. Alternatively, service firms may experience unmodeled cost decreases from positive externalities generated by capital-intensive industries. It also seems plausible that service establishments don't compete with manufacturing and transportation firms for land because of zoning regulations and differential site requirements.
Rural counties
In results not shown, estimates suggest rural employment shares increased for manufacturing, transportation, and FIRE, while wholesale trade and retail employment shares Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Urban and multistate MSA counties
As expected, increasing capital subsidy availability has somewhat different effects in urban counties as opposed to rural counties. In the full sample, urban counties experienced an increase in manufacturing, retail, and service establishment shares and a decrease in wholesale trade shares. The manufacturing and wholesale trade results are consistent with the theory that manufacturing establishments compete with wholesale trade establishments for the same land and that subsidy-induced cost savings allow manufacturing to outbid wholesale trade. The increase in retail trade and service establishment shares is unexpected given the theory, but it may suggest some positive spillovers between manufacturing and these sectors in urban areas. The service sector results may also be driven by relatively capital-intensive two-digit industries. Recall that the rural county results indicated potential positive spillovers between the services sector and manufacturing. Thus, these results also suggest that manufacturing may generate different externalities in rural and urban areas, perhaps because of different forward/backward linkages.
In results not shown, increasing the capital subsidy tools is associated with an increase in construction and retail employment shares in urban counties. This is consistent with the increase in construction and retail establishment shares in Panel B. Construction and retail cannot easily substitute capital for labor. Thus, an increase in their establishment shares associated with capital subsidies would be expected to increase their employment shares. There is not a significant change in the other industries' employment shares. Although manufacturing establishment shares increased with capital subsidies, the establishment share increase is not associated with a significant increase in employment shares. This is consistent with the capital-labor substitution predicted by theory and the estimated changes in manufacturing capital expenditure.
Manufacturing employment per establishment also decreases as urban counties' package of capital subsidies increases, further supporting subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution. The employment share results suggest that there were no significant changes in employment shares. Given the increase in manufacturing establishment shares associated with capital subsidies, lack of employment effects indicate subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution.
Employment per establishment decreases in manufacturing firms. This is consistent with theoretical predictions about capital-labor substitution. Border random trend estimates for rural, urban, and multistate MSA counties' change in industry establishment shares are presented in Table 8 , Panels A-C, respectively. The results largely corroborate the findings in Section 5. As capital subsidy packages increase, relatively capital-intensive manufacturing shares increase at the expense of wholesale trade shares. The positive effects on urban retail industry shares from Table 6 are also found in Table 8 , Panels B and C. Rural border-county retail shares, however, decrease with capital subsidies as predicted by theory. Table 8 also reports increases in construction industry shares associated with an increase in the IEI, perhaps suggesting subsidy-induced increases in demand for building capital, as predicted by theory. Column headings correspond to SIC major division. The unit of analysis is the two−digit SIC industry share of total county establishments. Control variables include measures for county demographics and average earnings as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND IEI MEASURES
Border Random Trend Estimates
6.2
Factor-Weighted IEI
This section explores the sensitivity of results to the assumption that the types of incentives covered under each clause have equal marginal effects. Estimates employ a weighted IEI, where weights are determined using principal component factor analysis. For the IEI, the scoring coefficients for Factor 1 weight the local current appropriations clause most heavily, followed by the local credit clause, local stock clause, and the state current appropriations clause.
Current appropriations activities include cash, grants, site development, and other aid from the general fund. For example, a location with a low current appropriations clause score is constitutionally prohibited from buying land to give to a company; while a location with a high current appropriations clause score could. The heavy weights given to the local credit clause and local stock clause suggests that low-cost financing through local government is an important capital subsidy as well, although less so than local government current appropriations. Thus, the IEI Factor 1 considers current appropriations and local financial partnerships as the most important capital subsidies. The state credit and stock clauses receive large weights in Factor 2.
Factor 2 could therefore be interpreted as capturing financial partnerships with the state. Tables 9 and 10 present results using the IEI factors. An increase in the IEI Factor 1-the current appropriation and local financial partnership factor-is associated with an increase in manufacturing capital expenditure and capital expenditure per employee in all samples. This is consistent with theoretical predictions and the results from Tables 4 and 5, above. Again, pooling urban and rural counties averages much stronger urban effects and weaker rural effects. The multistate MSA column of Table 9 , Panel A, NOTE: The table reports results from 12 separate regressions. Column headings correspond to the sample, with column (1) presenting results for the pooled county sample, columns (2) and (3) containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban counties, respectively, and column (4) corresponding to the sample of counties in multistate MSAs. The Panel A dependent variable is county manufacturing capital expenditure measured in $000s. Panel B presents results for manufacturing capital expenditure (measured in $000s) per employee. The dependent variable in Panel C is total wage and salary employment per square mile of land area. Controls include variables for county demographics, average earnings, and industrial structure as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditure, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. indicates that an increase in the IEI factor increases manufacturing capital expenditure by more than $9 million. Employment density decreases with an increase in both IEI factors (Table 9 , Panel C), as predicted. Table 10 indicates their increase comes at the expense of wholesale trade establishment shares. Again, this is consistent with manufacturing firms outbidding wholesale trade firms with whom they compete for land. There is also some indication of unmodeled positive externalities between manufacturing and the construction and retail industries in urban counties.
IEI Percentile Indicators
Tables 11 and 12 present results allowing for potential nonlinearities and concerns about small differences in the IEI. The variables of interest are indicator variables for the counties' position in the IEI distribution. The omitted category is the indicator variable for counties with IEI scores less than the twenty-fifth percentile score, representing the most restrictive capital subsidy environments in the distribution. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. $000s ) per employee. The variables of interest are indicator variables for the counties' position in the IEI distribution. The omitted category is the indicator variable for counties with IEI scores less than the 25th percentile score, representing the most restrictive capital subsidy environments in the distribution. Controls include variables for county demographics, average earnings, and industrial structure as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Equality cannot be rejected for the twenty-fifth-to-fiftieth and the fiftieth-to-seventy-fifth percentile indicators, but can for the seventy-fifth. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of scholarly consensus on the effects of economic development incentives, they remain the primary economic development tool for many state and local governments. Nontax incentives make up a substantial portion of economic development incentive packages; however, they are also the type of incentive about which we know the least.
Nontax incentives effectively subsidize capital as a job creation policy; however, the few studies examining nontax incentives suggest that these incentives do not support local job creation. The research herein investigates the mechanisms underlying these findings. Theory predicts that capital subsidies will have two effects. The first effect is capital-labor substitution, whereby firms adjust their input mix in favor of capital. Theory also predicts that subsidy-induced changes in total costs cause capital-intensive firms to outbid labor-intensive firms for land, resulting in changes in locations' industry mix.
The results presented herein indicate increasing capital subsidy availability is associated with both capital-labor substitution and changes in local industry mix. Consistent with previous findings, urban and rural counties respond differently to an increase in the IEI. Capital subsidies appear most effective at inducing new capital expenditure in urban areas. Employment densities decline with increases in available capital subsidies, consistent with theoretical predictions about capital-labor substitution. As predicted by theory, the industry employment share estimates also indicate that relatively capital-intensive industries increase their establishment shares at the expense of relatively labor-intensive industries with which they compete for land. The establishment-share results also suggest unmodeled spillovers between capital-intensive industries and labor-intensive industries, which vary between urban and rural areas. These findings suggest that further investigation of the interaction between capital subsidies and agglomeration externalities may be warranted. Taken together, the research presented herein suggests that subsidizing capital has consequences that may limit job creation effects. If capitallabor substitution and crowding out of labor-intensive industries by capital-intensive industries dominates any spillovers, then employment levels either decrease or remain unchanged, even when incentives change firm location behavior. 
